False Equivolence and/or any others?

What follows are two arguments about morality. The second argument attempts to counter the first one. I would like to know if you can see any fallacies in either of them. As with the second one, I can see a false equivalence. Ok, here they are:

Argument 1: 

Since every society across the globe adheres to some kind of moral codification doesn't that then mean that there is this inherent human/mammalian need for some kind of moral structure that serves the objective basis of morality? In other words, if we think of morality as an Iceberg, what we see on the surface is all subjective, but beneath that lies the objective foundation.

Argument 2:

 
If it were the case that every society across the globe believed in some creator god, there'd be an objective foundation to there being a creator god? Just because humans have developed a pre-disposition to worshipping some kind of an imaginary god doesn't mean the god themselves exists. In the same way, just because humans have developed a pre-disposition to abide by some imaginary set of morals doesn't mean that the morals themselves exist.

 

 

 

 

 

Argument 1 commits the naturalistic fallacy, which is the assumption that what is natural or common is automatically good, right, or desirable. Just because every society has a moral structure, does not necessarily mean that there is an objective basis for morality. This argument seems to be based more on observation than on solid logic.

Argument 2 contains a false equivalence fallacy. It equates the belief in a divine being or creator with morality. The existence of a creator is an issue of objective truth. Either there is a god or there isn't. Morality, on the other hand, can be argued to be either objective or subjective without contradiction. So to compare the two as if the same standards apply is misleading.

There also seems to be a logical fallacy called begging the question in argument 2. It claims that morals are 'imaginary' which is assuming the conclusion in the premise itself. What one person deems as 'imaginary' might be very real and significant to someone else.

The philosopher Daniel Dennett writes in his The Evolution of Misbelief:

“Other approaches notwithstanding, the currently dominant evolutionary perspective on religion remains a by-product perspective. On this view, supernatural misbeliefs are side effects of a suite of cognitive mechanisms adapted for other purposes. Such mechanisms render us hyperactive agency detectors, promiscuous teleologists, and intuitive dualists; collectively and incidentally, they predispose us to develop religious beliefs-- or at least they facilitate the acquisition of such beliefs.”

Recent scientific theory suggests that beliefs are-a residual by-product of an evolutionarily useful instinctive process (see Satoshi Kanazawa, an evolutionary psychologist at the London School of Economics).

Called the Savanna-IQ Interaction Hypothesis, Kanazawa's theory attempts to explain the differences in the behavior and attitudes of intelligent and less intelligent people, The hypothesis is based on two assumptions:

"First, we are psychologically adapted to solve recurrent problems faced by our hunter-gatherer ancestors in the African savanna."

"Second, that 'general intelligence' (what is measured by IQ tests) evolved to help us deal with nonrecurrent problems for which we had no evolved psychological adaptations."

The assumptions imply that "intelligent people should be better than unintelligent people at dealing with 'evolutionary novelty' — situations and entities that did not exist in the ancestral environment suggesting that evolutionary intelligence is something that opposes primitive instincts.

Thus, according to Edward Dutton, a research fellow at the Ulster Institute for Social Research in the United Kingdom.

"Religion is nothing more than a primitive instinct, whereas true Intelligence means rationally solving problems as a means to overcome religious instinct. Overcoming religious instinct means being intellectually curious and open to non-instinctive possibilities.”