Affirming The Consequent?

I agree... should have read this first, it would have saved me a post :)

"should have read this first, it would have saved me a post :)"

It was helpful to bring the discussion into unbiased territory with an argument about burial.

Hi, Jordan!

         The syllogism that you formulate does not beg the question. Here is the syllogism:

1. If God does not exist, then evil does not exist.

2. Evil does exist.

3. Therefore, God exists.

         You write, “…the first statement is still begging the question of whether God and evil are dependent on each other.”

         The first statement is question begging just in case it assumes that God exists. After all, the conclusion of the argument is that God exists and an argument begs the question just in case its premises assume the conclusion. But the first premise does not assume that God exists. The statement merely says that the nonexistence of God is a sufficient condition for the nonexistence of evil and does not say that this sufficient condition fails to obtains . As far as the statement is concerned, God does not exist.

[To Kaiden]

Hi Kaiden!

Not sure I follow. Let's say we are observing a debate between an atheist and an apologist where the atheist has admitted evil exists but is also arguing God does not exist (obviously).

The apologist counters with our first premise: "If God does not exist, then evil does not exist."

Wouldn't the atheist justifiably accuse the apologist of begging the question? Wouldn't he/she reply: "I reject the faulty premise that whether or not evil exists is dependent on whether or not God exists"?

As a humorous aside, you wrote the "statement merely says that the nonexistence of God is a sufficient condition for the nonexistence of evil." Aren't you begging the question of whether that statement is begging a question? It significantly says that the nonexistence of God is a sufficient condition for the nonexistence of evil, which I am arguing is a faulty premise. ;-)

[To Jordan Pine]

         A question begging argument is an argument in which the premises assume the conclusion. The conclusion of the syllogism we are discussing is that God exists. Putting these two points together, the argument we are discussing begs the question just in case its premises assume that God exists. The first premise in particular is what you have your eyes on. The first premise does not assume the negation of its antecedent, it just says something about what the antecedent is a condition of.

         Apparently, you claim that the first premise begs the question because the atheist in your scenario rejects it. But this misunderstands what question begging means. Stating a premise that your opponent rejects is not itself question begging. Question begging has to do with the badness of an argument. If the apologist in your example argued that his first premise is true because of certain reasons that assume the first premise, that would be question begging. But nowhere in your scenario do I see the apologist arguing for his first premise, let alone arguing fallaciously for it.

         You write, “As a humorous aside, you wrote the ‘statement merely says that the nonexistence of God is a sufficient condition for the nonexistence of evil.’ Aren't you begging the question of whether that statement is begging a question? It significantly says that the nonexistence of God is a sufficient condition for the nonexistence of evil, which I am arguing is a faulty premise. ;-)”

         Unless you seriously did not understand the sense in which I was using the word “merely”, I will enjoy a laugh, too.

[To Kaiden]

Ah, I see. Now we arrive at an interesting technical point about begging the question: the word “the.” You’re right. The syllogism doesn’t beg “the” question. It begs “a” question -- a related question essential to the syllogism. I called this a faulty premise as well. Perhaps that is the correct technical term?

Two other possibilities come to mind: 

1) complex question

2) unaccepted enthymemes

I don’t think #1 fits because the premise was not stated as a question. But similar to begging the question, the premise has the spirit of this fallacy, asking you to accept facts not in evidence.

As for #2, I think it only applies to unstated premises that are implied.

So where does that leave us? What do you call an argument that is dependent on a debatable premise that hasn’t been debated? I guess your point is the syllogism is logically valid IF ... (and then the opponent would dispute the IF because it is a faulty premise)?

So where does that leave us? What do you call an argument that is dependent on a debatable premise that hasn’t been debated? 

In my experience, this accounts for most arguments. The debate starts with an argument, then each premise is discussed and argued.

Thanks, Dr. Bo. I did have a question for you. Looking at the original sequence again :

1. If God does not exist, then evil does not exist.
2. Evil does exist. 
3. Evil is the absence of good.
4. You can't have one without the other (evil without good).
5. God is the ultimate good.
6. Therefore, God exists.

If #5 is taken as a premise that is part of the syllogism concluded in #6, would this then be begging the question? That is, doesn't saying "God is the ultimate good" beg the question of whether God exists?

On a related note, would any of the statements taken as premises constitute an unaccepted enthymeme? If not, what would an example of that look like in this context? Thanks!

That is, doesn't saying "God is the ultimate good" beg the question of whether God exists?

Good point. It does appear to meet the definition of begging the question fallacy. If I were arguing against this argument, I don't think I would bother arguing that fallacy because it appears that it is more definitional rather than supporting the conclusion. Recall the form:

Claim X assumes X is true.
Therefore, claim X is true.

The premise does assume God exists, but that is not WHY God exists (according to the entirety of the argument).

As far as your other question, I will admit that is not my strongest area. Perhaps Kaiden will be able to offer a better answer than I could on that.

[To Jordan Pine]

You write, "The syllogism doesn’t beg 'the' question."

I am glad that you and I reasoned to an agreement, Jordan. 

You asked me if my point is that “the syllogism is logically valid IF ...”

My point was not about laying out the conditions of validity. In the first place, I am not motivated to make such a point because you already agreed in your answer to Jack that the syllogism is valid. It was my point to explain that the syllogism is not begging the question. 

You write, “(and then the opponent would dispute the IF because it is a faulty premise)”

Even if the conditions of validity were spelled out, the opponent's disputation of the syllogism's validity would be wrongheaded if he referenced a faulty premise in the argument. Validity is about the link between the premises and the conclusion, not about the plausibility of the premises. 

[To Kaiden]

I am glad that you and I reasoned to an agreement, Jordan. 

Same, Kaiden. I have been using "begging the question" too loosely, and you helped correct that.

the opponent's disputation of the syllogism's validity would be wrongheaded if he referenced a faulty premise in the argument. Validity is about the link between the premises and the conclusion, not about the plausibility of the premises. 

Correct. I had moved past logical validity to examining the premises of the argument. There is little point in arguing a valid syllogism if one of the premises is faulty since the conclusion drawn will also be faulty. 

Recall the original question was examining an argument formed as a syllogism (at least in part). The poster wanted to know if there were any logical fallacies in the argument, but I inferred he also/really wanted to know the argument's weaknesses. In other words, once discovering there was nothing technically wrong with the argument, he would want to know a practical way to attack the truth of the argument. The answer: Attack the premises as false.

This raises another interesting point: I think many people conflate logical validity with truth. An argument can be logically valid and yet clearly untrue. False premises are the reason.

[To Jordan Pine]

So, the opponent accepts the conditions of validity and acknowledges that the argument is invalid. The remark “the syllogism is logically valid IF ... (and then the opponent would dispute the IF because it is a faulty premise)” was just unclear. Yes, you made a good move by starting your evaluation by checking the argument for validity and, next, the premises for truth; a valid argument can still be unsound because of a false premise. And no doubt, the premise you attacked is the more questionable of the two.

Given that, would the original syllogism qualify as an example of the fallacy of four terms ( quaternio terminorum )?

Do you mean the unnecessary definitions thrown in? No, because those aren't new terms found in conclusion; they just define existing terms.

No, I mean something different. My understanding of the fallacy of the four terms is that it is a syllogism with too many premises. Syllogisms should have three terms ( terminorum ) -- two premises and a conclusion -- not four ( quaternio ) or more.

In the main example here, it seems there are five terms: four premises and a conclusion.

Premise #1: If God does not exist, then evil does not exist.
Premise #2: Evil does exist. 
Premise #3: Evil is the absence of good.
Premise #4: You can't have one without the other (evil without good).
Premise #5: God is the ultimate good.
Conclusion: Therefore, God exists.

Am I understanding the fallacy correctly?

This argument is not a syllogism, however. There can be multiple premises, that is fine. The argument is inductive/informal with each premise taking the person through a step. I suggested that premises #3,4, and 5 were unnecessary, but perhaps more accurate would be if we wanted to make a syllogism then get rid of 3,4, and 5.

The fallacy of four terms is a specific attempt at a valid syllogism. This doesn't qualify. The use of "term" is not a premise; rather a subject in a premise. Take a look at the examples on the page of fallacy of four terms for more clarification.

[To Bo Bennett, PhD]

I agree. Just as I returned to this page to copy and paste my reply to Jordan, I read first and saw that you beat me to it. I am glad you did, though, because you made all of the same points but have a coveted talent for brevity.

[To Bo Bennett, PhD]

I see. What I thought of as premises were actually digressions or commentary. Interesting.

I guess it was confusing because it took the form of a syllogism (if/then, therefore) and, as you pointed out, could be easily made into one (a valid one at that) by removing the digression/commentary in the middle.

Thanks!

Thanks. I was still a bit confused here until you removed the bias and made another example. And as for the second example, I guess this makes it affirming the consequent then?

If I don't die, then I will not be buried.
I was not buried.
Therefore, I did not die.

Correct

  Epicurus expressed this problem thus: Either god would remove evil out of this world and cannot, or he can and will not, or he has not the power nor will, or, lastly, he has both the power and the will. 

If he [god] has the will and not the power, this shows weakness—which is contrary to the nature of god. If he has the power and not the will, it is malignity, and this is no less contrary to his nature. And if he is neither able nor willing, he is both impotent and malignant, and, consequently, cannot be god. And if he is both willing and able, which alone is consonant with the nature of god, whence comes evil? Why does he not prevent it?

Hume, and others, have worked on this problem. 

Why would David Hume want to solve this problem?

Epicurus's argument only works if we do not consider the are greater evils and lesser evils.  It is not malignant to not solve an evil if the only way to solve it is to create a far greater evil than the original evil.  If there are potential evils that do not presently exist that are the logical consequence of solving the actual evils that do exist, then we can both possess to means to solve the evils and choose not to employ them without being malignant. 

I think you may misunderstand the primariness of the Problem of Evil statement by Epicurus. The issue is not greater or lesser evils, but the existence of any evil --- big or small.

As to your question of why Hume wanted to solve the problem, from what I read, he did not want to solve it per se, he wanted to analyze the problem of evil. But, whatever was his motive, you'll need a medium to conduct a seance and ask him. I doubt you'll find one here.