'Miracles', and personal testimony
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Original Question
David Hume has a famous dictum: No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish.
John Dickson has called this dictum "bunkum", as, in his words:
"Hume's dictum is designed to exclude miracles on the premise that miracles aren't possible. It is not a dictum designed to probe the plausibility of any given miracle on the premise that they are, at least in principle, possible.
Think of it this way. Assume for a second miracles are possible (based on background beliefs about God). There is no reason to think that a miracle would leave behind more testimony than an ordinary event. Thus, the more appropriate dictum (on the assumption miracles are in principle possible) is: testimony may be sufficient to establish a miracle if it is the kind of testimony one would expect a genuine miracle to leave behind.
I am not alone in thinking Hume's objection to miracles is a deliberate stacking of the cards against miracles. It is widely discussed in philosophy."
I think Hume's dictum is rational. I disagree that it includes "the premise that miracles aren't possible" - I think this is a misreading of his dictum, as his dictum, properly understood, does permit the possibility of miracles.
I think the key words in Dickson's dictum are "the kind of testimony one would expect"; and, I think they are problematic: without committing the logical fallacy of begging the question, how are we to know what kind of testimony is the kind one would expect?
Does anyone have any thought(s) on these two dictums, and/or my analysis of them, and/or the general topic of 'miracles' and personal testimony?
Kind, rational wishes :)
xx
John Dickson has called this dictum "bunkum", as, in his words:
"Hume's dictum is designed to exclude miracles on the premise that miracles aren't possible. It is not a dictum designed to probe the plausibility of any given miracle on the premise that they are, at least in principle, possible.
Think of it this way. Assume for a second miracles are possible (based on background beliefs about God). There is no reason to think that a miracle would leave behind more testimony than an ordinary event. Thus, the more appropriate dictum (on the assumption miracles are in principle possible) is: testimony may be sufficient to establish a miracle if it is the kind of testimony one would expect a genuine miracle to leave behind.
I am not alone in thinking Hume's objection to miracles is a deliberate stacking of the cards against miracles. It is widely discussed in philosophy."
I think Hume's dictum is rational. I disagree that it includes "the premise that miracles aren't possible" - I think this is a misreading of his dictum, as his dictum, properly understood, does permit the possibility of miracles.
I think the key words in Dickson's dictum are "the kind of testimony one would expect"; and, I think they are problematic: without committing the logical fallacy of begging the question, how are we to know what kind of testimony is the kind one would expect?
Does anyone have any thought(s) on these two dictums, and/or my analysis of them, and/or the general topic of 'miracles' and personal testimony?
Kind, rational wishes :)
xx
Answers
2The problem with this whole line of argument is the word "miracle." The word is consistently conflated with a statistically impossible event, or an event that cannot be explained by natural laws, when in fact, the theological definition requires an interaction from a god or gods . Statistically impossible events (which are actually possible) happen all the time given the number of possible events, as do events that cannot be explained by natural laws (although much less common). To establish a miracle, one would need to provide convincing evidence that a god or gods were behind the event. The main fallacy here is ad hoc or after the fact reasoning. When someone claims a miracle, they are crediting their own god for the event by creating a narrative (i.e., my god wants this because...). People who presuppose a God who interferes in our lives see miracles everywhere, no matter how mundane (Jesus just apparently helped my brother list a house this weekend). To the skeptic, virtually no evidence can be strong enough for him or her to accept a miracle without the establishment of the existence of the god who is credited for the event. It all comes back to very low standards of evidence that believers are willing to accept when it is evidence for their god. We know this is a problem and poor reasoning because they are inconsistent in their reasoning... they don't accept the same level of evidence when claims are made about gods they don't believe in . They demand much better evidence, and they should.
What if it is defined beforehand which deity is being called?
As an example: "A man prays in the name of Jesus that another person is healed", and it happens.
It goes beyond logic whether adding the name of Jesus to the prayer makes the difference. There could be a connection between the
name and the event, or then it is only a consequence. The answer depends on the faith/worldview of the person.
I'd quess that Wittgenstein would argue here that: We must distinquish different types of language games. There is no one
rational ultimate argument to favor either side - its a matter of worldview (even logic has subjective side to it).
What do you think?
As an example: "A man prays in the name of Jesus that another person is healed", and it happens.
It goes beyond logic whether adding the name of Jesus to the prayer makes the difference. There could be a connection between the
name and the event, or then it is only a consequence. The answer depends on the faith/worldview of the person.
I'd quess that Wittgenstein would argue here that: We must distinquish different types of language games. There is no one
rational ultimate argument to favor either side - its a matter of worldview (even logic has subjective side to it).
What do you think?
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